Payment by Results (PbR) is a system of paying for health care. It is linked to activity and adjusted for case-mix. This article explores the background to PbR for critical care, explains some of the terminology and looks at the implications of its planned introduction in 2011/12.
Introduction
The white paper 'Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS' 1 makes only one mention of critical care. In paragraph 3.18 it states that 'The Department will mandate… in 2011/12 national currencies for adult and neonatal critical care.' This, at a stroke, brings Payment by Results (PbR) into critical care as a funding mechanism after a number of years of soul-searching by the Department of Health (DH).
This article aims to explain some of the background, processes and terminology used in the world of NHS finance relevant to critical care. It comes with a health warning. I am a clinician, not an accountant, and as such, this article is descriptive and a personal understanding of the process. It builds on an excellent review by Eddleston and Young in October 2009. 2 Before considering PbR, it is instructive to consider the current methods of funding critical care.
Traditional costing methodology
Hospitals currently use a variety of ways to contract for critical care. The contract at present is between providers (hospitals) and commissioners (Primary Care Trusts, PCTs), although this will change in the future. Some contracts have remained block contracts, other Trusts have negotiated an activity-based contract with their PCTs. To initiate a contract requires agreement between a Trust and commissioners on both the currency used and its value. One type of price unit, or currency, is an occupied bed day. Obtaining the unit cost in isolation is difficult in view of the numerous factors that go into making it up, so the provider works out the total cost over a time period. This total cost, made up of a series of cost 'buckets' is termed the 'reference cost.' To find out more on this topic, the reader is referred to the Reference Costs Collection Guidance 2009-10. 3 Although this document is concerned with producing the cost per critical care Healthcare Resource Group (HRG), it summaries the cost buckets that should be included in arriving at critical care reference costs, namely:
• Hotel services • Staff costs (medical/nursing and therapy)
Once the reference cost is determined, this is divided by the number of occupied bed days during that period, to give the price of a single day. This is a single price, irrespective of casemix or treatment needs of individual patients.
In order to negotiate a contract with a commissioner, the provider needs to estimate how many occupied bed days they expect to provide in a year. This involves a certain amount of crystal ball gazing and, as with arriving at the cost, is largely based on historical information, in this case, of activity. As critical care is a high-cost, low-volume specialty, contracting has the potential for considerable financial risk. A provider has to have the infrastructure and staff in place to provide critical care for the population they serve, even if projected activity does not materialise. The commissioners, on the other hand, do not want to find themselves paying for significant excess capacity.
The 'block contract' is one way of funding critical care. Taking a hypothetical example, assume that a hospital has worked out its reference costs as £1,000,000 and it has projected activity for the next financial year of 1,000 occupied bed days. This would give a cost per occupied bed day of £1,000. In negotiations, the PCT would contract for 1,000 bed days at £1000, assuming no increase in activity and zero uplift (no new money, blame the bankers) and pay for this regardless of actual activity. If the activity materialises, everyone will be happy. If it does not, while the provider may be smiling, the commissioner will not. If there are only 500 occupied bed days, the provider has the fixed costs for the 1,000 days (staff, equipment, etc) but the consumables and drug costs will be less than expected. The hospital will thus make a profit at the expense of the commissioner. Conversely if the provider has to squeeze 1,500 occupied bed days into its facility in a year, it will have the additional activity, but no extra funding. Now the PCT will be happy financially, all that extra activity at no extra cost, but the hospital will be under stress. The block contract is rather a blunt tool.
Why not operate on a cost per case basis? The cost per bed day is known, so fifteen hundred bed days of activity equals £1,500,000. Now the risk is reversed. Under-activity means the provider risks a loss, over-activity and the PCT gets an unexpected bill. It is not in the interest of either provider or commissioner to bankrupt the other. This is recognised in contracting guidance and there is scope to allow for variations in activity and adjust prices accordingly.
To get around these problems the provider and commissioner share the risk. This is termed a 'cost and volume' contract. Such contracts may be written in such a way that 80% of all anticipated expenditure will be agreed and the remaining 20% will be linked to activity. This is a common model in current use. How do providers receive recompense for overactivity? A variety of models exist, from payment for only variable costs, eg revenue associated with treatment, to payment for full cost. This is currently subject to local discussion and will depend on size of unit, occupancy and factors influencing desired occupancy, eg does this service support one or more tertiary services so might therefore require to function at a lower occupancy compared to a nearby hospital with no tertiary service.
Historically a minority of hospitals have secured an activitybased contract and the majority have instead been subject to block contracts covering the totality of the service with no triggers for over-performance.
Payment by Results
The deficiencies of the system described above were on the minds of the architects of PbR. PbR works by using HRGs as the unit of currency. HRGs are groupings of clinically-similar patients, who follow the same pathway and as such carry similar costs. 4 In specialties other than critical care, a large number of HRGs have been developed. The spells are variable and a patient, for example, having a cholecystectomy with an elective overnight stay is very different to one having an emergency procedure. Their use has primarily been for commissioning of services, but they also provide an opportunity for commissioners to incentivise 'best care'.
HRGs for critical care are not quite as simple as for a defined event such as a cholecystectomy. Within critical care, the population is very diverse. When the project group led by Peter Nightingale studied costs associated with the specialty, based on a paper that Claire Hibbert produced for the NHS Information Authority in 1995, it became apparent that it was the costs associated with interventions (namely organ support) which would best describe the critical care HRGs. 5 The expectation was that critical care HRGs would be introduced in April 2007. 7 Using this model, critical care has seven HRGs, which are related to the total number of organs supported during an episode of care within critical care. The organ support data for the HRGs is derived from the Critical Care Minimum Data Set (CCMDS). 7 The data set has 34 fields, 14 of which are mandatory for the HRG subset. The dataset covers: • admission and discharge times • where the patient came from • the type of critical care facility within which care is delivered • location after discharge • the nature and number of organs supported.
The record contains summated data of the total number of organs supported throughout the stay. It is advisable however to record the level of individual organ support on a daily basis.
To produce the HRG for a patient' s critical care episode (stay), the CCMDS for that patient is put through a 'grouper.' A grouper is a piece of software that analyses the dataset and outputs the HRG. The grouper logic, subsequently slightly modified, is outlined in DSC 01/2005. 8 To obtain the HRG, the grouper looks at the number of organs supported on each day and counts the total number of organs supported during the spell. The 2010-11 Payment by Results Guidance 9 details the seven HRGs. The payment structure is the HRG price multiplied by the number of bed days of the stay. Table 1 , taken from the PbR Guidance for 2010-11, shows the adult critical care HRGs together with average case mix (taken from the Department of Health Pilot Feedback) and benchmark price data from 2007-08 reference costs. The HRG prices in Table 1 include costs for outreach services submitted as reference costs. As you may expect most of the activity is for support of 1-3 organs. To deter from admitting patients with zero organ support, the costs for such patients have been reduced to a ward tariff and the monies nationally recorded as spent on this have been reallocated to 3+ organ support categories. To see how this works we can take a hypothetical examplea patient admitted with sepsis. The seven-day stay on the intensive care unit (ICU) produces the data from CCMDS shown in Table 2 . Here a 'day' is all or part of a 24-hour period between 00:01hr and 24:00 hr, a calendar day. The total number of organs supported in the spell is four and the HRG that this spell would attract is XC03Z. The price is £1,511 and the total remuneration the hospital would receive for the spell would be seven times this or £10,577.
If the total number of organs supported is 0, then providers need to be aware that the guide price for 0 organs supported (XC07Z) is unlikely to cover the costs of the patient.
As mentioned above, the intention was to introduce PbR in 2007, but this did not materialise. An exercise comparing income in 24 providers in 2008-09 10 showed that, had PbR been implemented, there would have been enormous changes in their income when compared with their existing financial arrangements. One small unit would have lost £1 million (31% loss), another teaching/specialist unit would have gained £31.6 million (a staggering 346% gain). Suggested reasons for the variation included poor data quality and reference costing, and whether units were mixed level 2 and level 3 or separate ICU and HDU. The impact of a national tariff was practically and politically not acceptable.
Thursday 6th May 2010, election day, and a week later a new government. Three weeks after that, there were hints from the Department of Heath that PbR for critical care would be introduced, and two weeks later indications that it will be mandatory, then on 12th July 2010 there it was, in black in the White Paper.
It seems likely that the emphasis for contracting will be on local, rather than national, tariffs. Contracting will have to change from the midnight bed count to an 'organ support day'. The NTCCN audit program, which covers critical care units in seven hospitals, has modelled the implications of this in the last financial year ( Table 3) . Moving from midnight bed count to organ support days will increase the number of days of critical care by about 25%. It is interesting to note that the precise length of stay (minute-by-minute count) is very similar to the midnight bed count. The pot of money for critical care is unlikely to change, so if organ support days are taken to inform the HRG rather than the midnight bed count, the price per HRG will be lower. Some Trusts have already moved to organ support days as a descriptive of their activity.
HRG tariffs are likely to be subject to local negotiation. This will avoid the destabilisation feared should a national tariff be introduced. It does seem to slightly diverge from the intentions of PbR, and indications are that the term PbR is being downgraded in its application in critical care. One could speculate that, as the system settles down, there will be a drift towards a national tariff. In the interim, it will be interesting to see if the networks can agree local prices, based on the figures above, or whether individual trusts will negotiate directly with the Commissioning Board.
One of the suggested methods is capacity funding based on an 80/20 model as with the old contracts discussed above. I assume this will mean that contracts for HRGs will be based on the average case mix shown in Table 1 adjusted according to actual activity. Another is the 100% patient-based model, which I assume means you pay for what you get. To me this seems fundamentally fairer and allows a local provider to fund what they supply. It would also mean that units attracting little activity would have their viability questioned. Whether this is something local health care communities can digest remains to be seen and may well be influenced by geographical location.
The quality agenda, which was highlighted and sponsored in the Darzi report, is a priority for the new administration. Quality is mentioned 108 times in the White Paper. Outcomebased quality measures are to be included in the service specification and it must be assumed that a proportion of the funding units will receive will be based on whether they meet pre-set quality criteria. Exactly what these metrics should be, or how they will be applied, have not yet been nationally defined and may afford local conurbations an opportunity to design metrics which incentivise a particular pathway of care which historically has been difficult to achieve. Networks should be poised to accept such a role as arguably they possess the local knowledge which could incentivise best care. An example may be non-clinical transfers. Such transfers remain a major concern for individual clinicians. Any way of ensuring these are kept to a minimum would be a positive aspect of any new contracting arrangements. Using them as a quality indicator, and using the contract to discourage them would, in my view, be a positive development.
Conclusions
The introduction of PbR for critical care represents a significant change to the way our units are financed. HRGs based on the total number of organs supported and organ support days will provide a significant challenge to those versed in more traditional ways of contracting for critical care. As in all negotiations the devil will be in the detail, but PbR in critical care offers one way of levelling out funding anomalies between units, provided that negotiations occur on a Network wide rather than individual provider basis.
